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In the most cases, there is a difference between the tax declared by companies and the tax determined by tax authorities. The 
current study, aims the relationship of differences in declared and final taxes with some firm characteristics and corporate 
governance criteria in companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange including 102 listed companies (510 observations). The 
research hypotheses tested using the multiple linear regression (MLR) along with the generalized panel method of integrated 
data. The findings of the study indicate that there is a positive and significant relationship between interest expense coverage 
ratio, earnings before tax (EBT) to revenue ratio, and earnings before tax (EBT) to total assets ratio and differences in declared 
and final taxes; as a result, the higher the ratios are, the greater the tax wedge will be. Also, according to the results, no 
significant relationship is observed between differences in declared and final taxes and other variables including firm size and 
debt ratio, the ownership percentage of the big owner, presence of the state shareholder with minimum influence, 
independence of the board, and existence of the tax paragraph in financial audit report. 
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 Introduction  1.
 
The purpose of the current study is to examine the factors associated with the tax declared by companies and the tax 
determined by tax authorities. Today, tax apart from its main role; namely supplying portion of the costs, may take into 
consideration as a lower influencing the expansive and contractible policies of the government in budgeting different parts 
of the any country. Thus, the need for the realization of tax income for sustainable development of the country is felt more 
than ever now days. In order to achieving this objective, undoubtedly, it is necessary to apply an efficient tax system with 
maximum collection and minimum cost; and it will be possible when tax rules relating to taxation principles, commercial 
law, accounting standards and laws of development programs of the country are simple, robust and unexplainable as 
possible; so that they can make collection of taxes easily, increase tax incomes, and minimize the difference between 
taxpayers and tax recipients (Davani, 2007); hence, tax compliance is a challenging issue in most tax organizations, even 
developed countries as well developing countries. According to evidences, tax compliance is not desirable in Iran as well 
and there is a significant difference between declared and final taxes of companies. This situation leads to delays and 
prolongation of tax collection and spending too much time by tax organizations and ultimately increases tax collection 
expenses. 
Now the question is whether it is possible to plan and take action based on firm characteristics and some features 
of corporate governance to identify tax wedge and achieve a faster tax collection or not? In this aspect, the present study 
investigates the relationship of differences in declared and final taxes with some firm characteristics (such as firm size, 
debt ratio, earnings before tax (EBT) to revenue ratio, and earnings before tax (EBT) to total assets ratio) and some 
features of corporate governance including the presence of state shareholders with minimum influence, ownership 
percentage of the big shareholder (ownership concentration), independence of the board, and existence of the tax 
paragraph in audit report. In fact, identifying the factors affecting tax wedge can help the Taxation Affairs Administration in 
faster identification and handling and less costly tax collection. Also, the results of this research can contribute to 
authorities for realization reasons of this difference in order to reduction in tax disagreement and receiving taxes. 
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 Literature and Hypothesis Development 2.
 
2.1 The difference between declared and final taxes 
 
The declared tax is a tax provided by companies based on the tax declaration subject to Article 110 of the Direct Taxation 
Act (Collection Rules of direct taxes second edition, 2002); and the final tax is a tax that is determined as the definitive tax 
by the Taxation Affairs Administration after assessing tax declaration of companies during different stages of the tax 
process. According to the amendment of Article 105 of the Direct Taxation Act, approved in 2001, the aggregate income 
earned by companies, and the income earned from various sources in Iran or abroad, through profit-making activities or 
by other juridical entities after levying the losses resulting from non-exempt sources and after having deducted the 
exemptions as prescribed, excluding the cases subject to different rates under the provisions made in the present Act be 
liable to 25% tax rate; so the calculation of declared and final taxes may be conducted based on this article of the Direct 
Taxation Act. However, due to various reasons there are differences between the calculation of declared and final taxes.  
Babajani and Abdi (2010) conclude that there is a significant difference between the percentage of taxable profit of 
declared and final taxes. Talebnia et al. (2013) investigate the reasons for differences in declared and final taxes from 
three perspectives including “rejection of some costs by tax auditor”, “rejection of some costs due to being inconsistent 
with accounting standards and tax rules”, and “rejection of statutory books”. The results of this study showed that in the 
first case, the difference is significant with the maximum amount of 37% resulting from the absence of (or failure to 
provide) documentation and invoices proving the cost; in the second case, the difference is not significant; but in the third 
case, the difference is significant and its maximum amount is due to not recording one or more activities in books. From 
another perspective, tax wedge is divided into two parts including tax evasion and tax avoidance. Tax evasion is 
considered as a violation of the law. In fact, when taxpayers refuse to correctly report their taxable income, the illegal act 
of tax evasion has been performed. However, tax avoidance is resulted from legal gaps in tax laws which allow people to 
look for loopholes to reduce their tax (Moosavi et al., 2009). Tax avoidance activities are commonly known as tax saving 
tools which transfer resources from the government to shareholders and increase the after-tax firm value (Desai and 
Dharmapala, 2006). The present study investigates the difference in declared and final taxes, of any kind and for any 
reason. 
Previous researchers (Richardson et al, 2015; Chen et al , 2014; Seyrek and Ata, 2009; Frank et al, 2008; 
Poorheidari and Sarvestani, 2013; Bagherpour vlashani et al, 2012; Nmazi et al, 2008) investigated factors affecting the 
difference in declared and final taxes as well as the relationship of tax wedge with financial and non-financial factors. 
These studies have obtained different results. Accordingly, the present study attempts to investigate the relationship of 
differences in declared and final taxes with some firm characteristics (such as firm size, financial leverage, and 
profitability) and some features of corporate governance (including ownership structure, independence of the board, and 
existence of the tax paragraph in financial audit report) in companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. In the 
following, theoretical foundations of these features are discussed below. 
 
2.2 Hypothesis development 
 
2.2.1 Firm size 
 
Large companies due to desirable accounting systems and internal controls as well as monitoring contracts and 
corporate governance, prepare financial statements more carefully (Ireland, 2003). The results of a study conducted by 
Seyrek and Ata (2009) indicate an inverse relationship between firm size and the likelihood of fraud in financial 
statements; on the contrary, Didar et al. (2014) investigate the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on tax gap in 
companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange and found a positive relationship between firm size and tax gap. Frank 
et al. (2008) investigate the association between aggressive tax and financial reporting and find a strong, positive relation 
where the firm size is positively associated to tax avoidance. Poorheidari and Sarvestani (2013) investigate the impact of 
firm characteristics, industry type, and institutional ownership on the difference between declared and final taxes of 
companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange and concluded that there is a positive and significant relationship 
between firm size and tax wedge (the amount of difference between declared and final taxes). In this regard, Abdoli et al. 
(2013) investigate the relationship between aggressive financial reporting and firm size and aggressive tax policies in 102 
companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange and concluded that there is a greater difference between declared and 
diagnostic taxes in firms with larger size. However, Bagherpour vlashani et al. (2012) did not find any significant 
relationship between firm size and tax evasion (the ratio of tax wedge to final tax). Dyreng et al. (2008) suggest that firm 
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size may play a role in tax management, and they find that smaller firms have higher tax rates. Based on prior research 
(Richardson and Lanis, 2007), we expect to find that larger firms are more likely to be tax avoidant because they possess 
superior economic and political power relative to smaller firms and are able to reduce their tax burdens accordingly. Here, 
considering the research theoretical foundations and literature, the first hypothesis of the research is proposed as follows: 
H1: There is a positive significant relationship between firm size and the difference in declared and final taxes.  
 
2.2.2 Financial leverage 
 
Financial leverage as a firm characteristic reflects the company’s ability to repay debts, especially long-term ones. Tax 
benefits are considered as one of the factors that influence the financing strategy (Graham, 1996). To achieve a certain 
level of debt, management manipulates financial statements; and as a result, the high level of debt creates the interest 
tax advantage for these companies (Hashemi and Mehrabi, 2008). Jensen (1986) shows that higher levels of debt 
combat agency problems. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) argue that companies substitute between debt and non-debt tax 
shields. Hasan et al. (2013) find that the positive relation between tax avoidance and bank loan spread is particularly 
pronounced in firms with higher information risk, higher agency risk. Richardson et al. (2015) show a positive relationship 
between financial leverage and tax wedge; but on the contrary, Didar et al. (2014) found that there is a negative 
relationship between financial leverage and tax gap. Also, Frank et al. (2009) show capital structure (debts) is negatively 
associated to tax avoidance. On the other hand, Poorheidari and Sarvestani (2013) did not observed any significant 
relationship between the degree of financial leverage and firm life cycle and the difference in declared and final taxes. 
Similarly, results of the study conducted by Bagherpour vlashani et al., (2012) show that there is no significant 
relationship between leverage ratios and tax evasion. Also, Izadinia and Rasayian (2009) investigate the relationship 
between capital structure and taxes of companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange and found that there is no 
significant relationship between capital structure and taxes of those companies. Prior research (Stickney and McGee, 
1982) finds that leverage is positively associated with tax avoidance. LEV is positively associated with tax avoidance due 
to tax-deductible interest payments. Accordingly, to examine the relationship between leverage ratios (debt ratio and 
interest expense coverage ratio) and tax wedge, the research second and third hypotheses are proposed as follows:  
H2: There is a positive significant relationship between the degree of financial leverage and the difference in 
declared and final taxes. 
H3: There is a significant relationship between the interest expense coverage ratio and the difference in declared 




A main reason why companies engage in tax management is to improve performance. In order to examine for overall 
performance and tease out the specific effects of tax management, we examine effect of ROA o difference in declared 
and final taxes. It argues companies with negative earnings can easily skew the results. Profitability criteria express 
cumulative effects of liquidity, assets management and liabilities in a business unit and show the overall result of all 
strategies applied there. The results of studies conducted in this regard indicate an inverse relationship between 
profitability and the likelihood of fraud in financial statements (Seyrek and Ata, 2009). Dyreng et al. (2008) suggest that 
growth may play a role in tax management, and they find that higher-growth firms have higher tax rates. Frank et al., 
(2008) show firm profitability is positively associated to tax avoidance. According to Badertscher et al., (2013) companies 
with higher profit have more incentives for tax evasion. Similarly, Poorheidari and Sarvestani (2013) concludes that there 
is a positive and significant relationship between a company’s opportunities for growth and profitability and the difference 
between declared and final taxes of the company. Thus, Mironov (2013) shows that the level of tax enforcement can be 
positively related to firm performance. The results of a study conducted by Rahmani and Arbabi (2014) indicate that there 
is a significant relationship between earnings management and the difference in declared and diagnostic taxes and the 
relationship is not affected by different models of earnings management. Modarres et al., (2013) investigate the 
information content of differences in declared and final taxes and its relationship with earnings quality and concluded that 
the difference in declared and final taxes has no significant relationship with stock return and market value of stocks. 
Hence, to investigate the relationship between profitability and tax wedge, the present study uses the ratios of earnings 
before tax (EBT) to revenue and earnings before tax (EBT) to total assets; accordingly, the fourth and fifth hypotheses of 
the research are proposed as follows:  
H4: There is a significant relationship between earnings before tax (EBT) to revenue ratio and the difference in 
declared and final taxes. 
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H5: There is a significant relationship between earnings before tax (EBT) to total assets ratio and the difference in 
declared and final taxes. 
 
2.2.4 Ownership structure 
 
According to theoretical foundations there is a relationship between ownership structure and firm performance (Nmazi et 
al., 2008). Institutional investors, due to their trusteeship responsibility, have additional incentive to ensure that decisions 
lead to maximizing shareholders’ wealth (Bushee, 2001; David et al., 2001). Due to supervisory role of institutional 
shareholders, they can reduce agency conflicts and cause managers to make optimal use of cash flows resulting from tax 
savings to maximize firm value (Poorheidari and Sarvestani, 2013). The role of institutional shareholders in tax 
management is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The role of institutional shareholders in tax 
management is affected by the amount of ownership of institutional shareholders. Excluding exceptional cases, if more 
than 50% of ownership owned by institutional shareholders, they may have a controlling role; and in the case of owning 
20-50% of ownership (a common case), they may play an effective role in tax management; in other words, they may 
significantly influence in this regard (Accounting Standards of Iran, No. 20). In this respect, Annuar et al. (2014) 
investigate the relationship between ownership structure and tax avoidance in Malaysia based on cost-benefit 
considerations and suggested that domestic, foreign, and state ownership have a direct relationship with tax avoidance. 
Chen et al. (2010) concludes that there are more tax aggressive activities in joint stock firms. It should also be considered 
that governments, due to having the power to decide about companies and implement their macroeconomic policies, are 
always counted as a major investor and companies’ accounting and reporting systems affected by their corporate 
governance are under influence of the type of corporate ownership (Mohd Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Ebrahimi and 
Shahryari, 2009). Hence, if governmental agencies considerably invest in a company, they can gain significant influence 
in the company as well having control to the company. In this case, it is expected that the interests of stakeholders 
(including government) are met better through providing timely and reliable information; and as a result, the tax gap is 
reduced. In this regard, Didar et al. (2014) investigated the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on tax gap in 
companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange and found a negative relationship between state ownership and tax gap. 
As such, studies like Chen et al. (2013); Kim and Zhang (2013); Wu et al. (2013); and Zhang and Han (2008) investigate 
the relationship between government ownership and corporate avoidance in China and documented negative relationship 
except for Zhang and Han (2008).  
The present study, to examine the relationship between ownership structure and tax wedge, uses “ownership 
percentage of the big owner” and “presence of the state shareholder with minimum influence”; accordingly, the sixth and 
seventh hypotheses of the research are proposed as follows:  
H6: There is a significant relationship between ownership percentage of the big owner and the difference in 
declared and final taxes. 
H7: There is a significant relationship between presence of the state shareholder with minimum influence and the 
difference in declared and final taxes. 
 
2.2.5 Independence of the board  
 
The board of directors is considered as one of the most important factors in controlling and monitoring the management 
as well protecting the resources of shareholders. According to the agency theory, the presence of outside directors in the 
board of companies and their supervisory function as independent individuals helps to reduce the conflict of interests 
between shareholders and managers; so, the more independent the board members are, the less the agency problems 
will be (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991). As such, studies documented the effect of board characteristics on corporate tax 
avoidance (Minnick & Noga, 2010; Lanis & Richardson, 2011; Vafeas, 2010). It is argued that unlike inside directors, 
outside directors are independent of the company’s management, so they perform their supervisory role more effectively 
and it is expected that independent boards to be in a better position to propel the resources towards tax management; 
play an effective role in reducing the difference between declared and final taxes. Hence, from theoretical aspect, when 
the majority of board members are outside directors, the firm performance is enhanced and tax-aggressive behaviors are 
reduced (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). In this regard, Lanis and Richardson (2011) conclude that the presence of a high 
proportion of outside directors in the board reduces the likelihood of tax-aggressive behaviors. Similarly, Didar et al. 
(2014) investigate the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on tax gap in companies listed on the Tehran Stock 
Exchange and found a negative relationship between independence of the board and tax gap. Also, Poorheidari and 
Borhaninejad (2012) in a study as “The impact of corporate governance features on tax management of companies listed 
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on the Tehran Stock Exchange” concluded that there is no significant relationship between the board size and tax 
management, but there is a negative and significant relationship between the board composition and the effective tax 
rate; so that the higher the percentage of outside members of the board is, the more the tax management and the less 
the tax wedge will be. Bhagat and Black (1999) find that small boards and more independent directors are not necessarily 
related to strong firm performance. On the contrary, Bagherpour Vlashani et al. (2012) in a study concluded that there is a 
negative and significant relationship between independence of the board and tax evasion in automobile industry. 
Accordingly, the present study, to investigate the relationship between independence of the board and tax wedge, uses 
the percentage of outside members of the board; so, the eighth hypothesis of the research is proposed as follows:  
H8: There is a significant relationship between the percentage of outside members of the board and the difference 
in declared and final taxes.  
 
2.2.6 Tax paragraph in financial audit report  
 
Existence of the tax paragraph in financial audit report is necessary because of disagreement about the recorded tax 
saving or limitations in estimating the saving; so, it is expected that existence of the tax paragraph in financial audit report 
to increase the percentage of tax wedge compared to cases without the tax paragraph. In this regard, Didar et al. (2014) 
investigated the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on tax gap in companies listed on the Tehran Stock 
Exchange and found a negative relationship between the type of audit opinion and tax gap. On the contrary, Bagherpour 
Vlashani et al. (2012) in a study as “Investigating the financial and non-financial factors affecting tax evasion using data 
mining techniques in automobile and parts manufacturing industry” did not find any significant relationship between 
existence of the tax paragraph in financial audit report and tax evasion. Firm management may perceive that the risks of 
audit by the tax authority or reputational damage following media release of an audit, given the circumstances, are less 
significant in the face of financial distress, therefore it may decrease tax avoidance. Accordingly, the ninth hypothesis of 
the research is proposed as follows: 
H9: there is a significant relationship between existence of the tax paragraph in financial audit report and the 




3.1 Sampling Method 
 
The research population consists of all manufacturing companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. Since the final 
tax of 2013 had not been specified at the time the study was being done, the time period of the research was considered 
to be 2004-2012. On the other hand, determining the final tax is a time-consuming process and it can take several years 
for a 8-year period; hence, to have access to the information of final tax, the time period of the research was reduced to 4 
years (2004-2008); however, for further information on the final tax of 2008andyears before it, the financial statements 
used in this research are up to 2012. In this study, the systematic elimination method has been used as the sampling 
method and the companies that have the following conditions were selected as samples and others were excluded from 
the statistical sample. The conditions are as follows: 
1- All information about the declared and final taxes of the company in 2004-2008 should be available. 
2- Management and financial information related to the taxes, especially explanatory notes accompanying 
financial statements should be available. 
3- Companies’ fiscal year should end on March 20. 
Considering the above conditions, 102 companies selected as the statistical sample. 
 
3.2 Data collection  
 
Considering the reliability of financial reports of companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange, the reports have been 
used as the main source of information for conducting the research. The reports include basic financial statements of the 
companies under test in 2004-2012, which have been collected through the websites of Securities and Exchange 
Organization including “www.rdis.ir” and “www.codal.ir”. Also, Excel software and the statistical software of R have been 
used to test the research hypotheses. The research data have been collected using the library and archive methods. The 
data are classified into two categories: the first part includes the information related to the research foundations and 
literature collected from books, valid articles, scientific journals, student theses and reputable sites; and the second part 
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includes the data and information needed to perform research, which have been collected from the official websites of 
Tehran Stock Exchange (www.irbourse.com), Development and Research Management of Islamic Studies of Tehran 
Stock Exchange (www.rdis.ir), and Comprehensive Database of All Listed Companies (www.codal.ir).  
To perform the research, all collected data firstly are entered into an Excel spreadsheet and then the initial 
calculations are done. Considering the issue that the number of companies under study has been fixed during the time 
period of the research (4 years), the data are arranged based on a balanced panel and analyzed using statistics 
methods.  
 
3.3 Research model 
 
The present research investigates the relationship of firm characteristics and corporate governance with the percentage 
of difference between declared and final taxes based on the multiple linear regression model. In fact, there are many 
studies investigating the difference between declared and final taxes, but all of them have used different ways for this 
purpose; for example, Didar et al. (2014) have used the ratio of difference in declared and final taxes to the declared tax, 
Poorheidari and Sarvestani (2013) have used the amount of difference in declared and final taxes, and Bagherpour 
Vlashani et al. (2012) have used the ratio of difference in declared and final taxes to the final tax. Due to the fact that in 
some cases the declared tax of companies is equal to zero, using the ratio of difference in declared and final taxes to the 
declared tax cannot be an appropriate method. Also, due to failure to homogenize the tax wedge of companies, the 
amount of difference in declared and final taxes cannot be a good measure. On the other hand, using the difference 
between declared and final taxes, especially in cases where the declared tax has been reported to be zero, does not lead 
to an optimal homology of tax wedge of companies under study. Hence, to calculate the tax wedge, the present study 
uses the ratio of difference in declared and final taxes to revenue. The reason for using this method is that the sale is 
used as the tax symmetry to determine the per capita tax; also, the amount of revenue creates the maximum homology of 
tax wedge in companies under study. 
οܶܣ ௜ܺǡ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܵ݅ݖ݁௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଶܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଷܧܤܫܶݐ݋ܫ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚସܧܤܶݐ݋ܴ݁ݒ݁݊ݑ݁௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚହܧܤܶݐ݋ܣݏݏ݁ݐ௜ǡ௧ ൅
ߚ଺ܩ݋ݒ݋ݓ݊݁ݎ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚ଻ܤ݅݃݋ݓ݊݁ݎ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚ଼ܱݑݐ݀݅ݎ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଽܶܽݔܲܽݎܽ݃ݎܽ݌݄௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߝ௜ǡ௧In above equation: 
οܶܣ ௜ܺǡ௧: It stands for the percentage of difference between declared and final taxes of company ݅ in yearݐ; and to 
homogenize it among companies, it is calculated through being divided by revenue as follows:  
οܶܣ ௜ܺǡ௧ ൌ ሺሺܨ݈݅݊ܽܶܽݔ െ ܦ݈݁ܿܽݎ݁݀ݐܽݔሻȀܴ݁ݒ݁݊ݑ݁ሻ ൈ ͳͲͲ  
Sizei,t: It stands for the firm size of company ݅ in yearݐ and is calculated though the natural logarithm of total 
assets. 
Leveragei,t: It stands for the financial leverage of company ݅  in year ݐ  and is calculated though dividing total 
liabilities by total assets. 
EBIT to I i,t : It stands for the earnings before interest and taxes divided by the interest expense of company ݅ in 
yearݐ. 
EBTto Revenue i,t: It stands for the earnings before tax divided by the revenue of company ݅ in yearݐ. 
EBT toAsset i,t: It stands for the earnings before tax divided by the total assets of company ݅ in yearݐ. 
Govowneri,t: It stands for the state shareholder with minimum influence in company ݅ in yearݐ. In the case of 
presence such a shareholder, its value is considered to be equal to 1; otherwise, the value will be zero. 
Bigowneri,t: It stands for the ownership percentage of the big owner in company ݅ in yearݐ. 
Outdiri,t: It stands for the percentage of outside directors to entire members in the board of company ݅ in yearݐ. 
The outside director is a member who does not have executive responsibility in the company. 
TaxParagraphi,t: It stands for existence or absence of the tax paragraph in financial audit report of company ݅ in 
yearݐ.  
 
 The Results 4.
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 shows the results of descriptive statistics used to investigate characteristics of the statistical population. As 
observed in table 1, due to the closeness of mean value to median value in most variables, it can be concluded that 
variables are normally distributed. Also, since the minimum, maximum, mean, and median values of “percentage of 
difference in declared and final taxes to revenue” are respectively equal to 0,12.8%, 0.88%, 0.4% of the revenue, it can 
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be concluded that the tax wedge of half of the companies are equal to 0.4-12.8% of the revenue. Identifying these 
companies in the early stages of tax proceedings based on firm characteristics and corporate governance leads to the 
faster and lower-cost collection of taxes. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables Symbol Min Max Mean Median Stand. Dev 
Percentage of Difference in Declared and Final Taxes 
to Revenue οܶܣܺ  0.000 12. 8 0.88 0.4 1,415 
Logarithm of Total Assets ܵ݅ݖ݁  10.158 18.042 13.221 13.039 1.355 
Ratio of Debt ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁  0.154 1.414 0.625 0.646 0.177 
Interest Expense Coverage Ratio ܧܤܫܶ ݐ݋ ܫ  -25.00 2448.00 226.01 7.45 664.19 
Earnings Before Tax to Revenue Ratio ܧܤܶ ݐ݋ ܴ݁ݒ݁݊ݑ݁ -1.135 2,000 0,250 0.189 0,266 
Earnings Before Tax to Total Asset Ratio ܧܤܶ ݐ݋ ܣݏݏ݁ݐ  -0.248 0.753 0.176 0.158 0.138 
Ownership Percentage of Big Owner ܤ݅݃݋ݓ݊݁ݎ  3.00 100.00 51. 82 49.99 23.00 
 
4.2 Analysis the data 
 
After calculating each of the variables, the statistical software of R has been used to estimate the best regression 
method. Accordingly, the F-Limer test has been firstly used to choose between panel and multiple linear regressions. The 
null hypothesis of the test indicates that the multiple linear regression model (OLS) is appropriate while the opposite 
hypothesis indicates that the panel regression model is more appropriate. Table 2 shows the results of the F-Limer test. 
 
Table 2: Results of the F-Limer test  
 
Null Hypothesis (ࡴ૙) F-statistic P-value Test Results 
Preference of the OLS Method 1.3081 0.0376 Rejection of ܪ଴ (panel method is better) 
 
The results of the test show that P-value is lower than 0.05; so the null hypothesis is rejected and the panel regression 
method is accepted. 
Again, the F-Limer test is used to choose the appropriate method from panel and multiple linear regressions when 
the time factor is considered. The null hypothesis of the test indicates that the multiple linear regression model is 
appropriate along with the time factor while the opposite hypothesis indicates that the panel regression model is more 
appropriate. Table 3 shows the results of the F-Limer test. 
 
Table 3: Results of the F-Limer test for time factor 
 
Null Hypothesis (ࡴ૙) F-statistic P-value Test Results 
Preference of the OLS Method 1.3052 0.04105 Rejection of ܪ଴ (fixed effects method is better) 
 
Considering the results of the test which show that P-value is lower than 0.05, it is concluded that at the significance level 
of 1%, the panel data method should be selected from panel and multiple linear regressions. 
Here, the Hausman test has been used to choose the panel model with fixed effects or the panel model with 
random effects. Table 4 shows the results.  
 
Table 4: Results of the Hausman test 
 
Null Hypothesis (ࡴ૙) Chi Square-statistic P-value Test Results 
Using the Random Effects Method 13.489 0.1417 ܪ଴is not rejected (random effects method is better) 
 
According to results of the Hausman test, the random effects method is better. Also, the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange 
multiplier (LM) has been used to test the integrated data model against random effects. Table 5 shows the results. 
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Table 5: Results of the Breusch-Pagan (LM) test 
 
Null Hypothesis (ࡴ૙) Chi Square-statistic P-value Test Results 
Using the integrated data model 0.1285 0.9378 ܪ଴ is not rejected 
 
According to results of the Breusch-Pagan test, the panel method of integrated data is more appropriate. 
Here, the Dickey–Fuller test has been used to examine the appropriateness of the model. The null hypothesis of 
Dickey–Fuller test indicates that the dependent variable is not static while the opposite hypothesis indicates that the 
dependent variable is static. Table 6 shows the results.  
 
Table 6: Results of the Dickey–Fuller test 
 
Null Hypothesis (ࡴ૙) Dickey–Fuller Statistic P-value Test Results 
Dependent variable is not static -8.0164 0.01 Rejection of ܪ଴ (Dependent variable is static) 
 
Results of the Dickey–Fuller test indicate that the dependent variable is static; therefore, the fitting of the panel model is 
appropriate. 
Here, the Breusch-Godfrey test has been used to choose between the panel model and the generalized 
autocorrelation panel model. The null hypothesis of Breusch-Godfrey test indicates that there is no serial autocorrelation 
while the opposite hypothesis indicates that there is a serial autocorrelation. Table 7 shows the results. 
 
Table 7: Results of the Breusch-Godfrey test 
 
Null Hypothesis (ࡴ૙) Chi Square-statistic P-value Test Results 
There is no serial autocorrelation 57.8421 <0.01 Rejection of ܪ଴ (there is a serial autocorrelation) 
 
Thus, due to the existence of a serial autocorrelation, the fitting of the panel model is not appropriate; hence, the 
generalized panel method of integrated data is used. Table 8 shows the results obtained from fitting the model and 
testing the significance of coefficients relating to the difference between declared and final taxes. 
The t-statistic is used to investigate the significance of independent variables coefficients. The null hypothesis of 
the test indicates that the independent variable has no effect on the dependent variable; in other words, the coefficient of 
the independent variable is equal to zero. The decision about rejection or acceptance of the null hypothesis is made 
based on the P-value. In the case of a P-value lower than 0.05, the null hypothesis indicating that the independent 
variable has no effect on the dependent variable is rejected and the opposite hypothesis indicating that there is a 
significant relationship between independent and dependent variables is accepted.  
 











Intercept ߙ  510 0.4232 0.3262 1.2975 0.195  
Logarithm of Total Assets ܵ݅ݖ݁  510 -0.0328 0.0215 -1.526 0.1274  
Ratio of Debt ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁  510 -0,0261 0.171 -0.1531 0.8783  
Interest Expense Coverage Ratio ܧܤܫܶ ݐ݋ ܫ  510 0.00008 0.000 -1.9861 0.0475 * 
Earnings Before Tax to Revenue Ratio ܧܤܶ ݐ݋ ܴ݁ݒ݁݊ݑ݁  510 1.098 0.1387 7.9161 0.000 *** 
Earnings Before Tax to Total Asset Ratio ܧܤܶ ݐ݋ ܣݏݏ݁ݐ  510 0.8027 0.2686 -2.988 0.0029 ** 
Ownership Percentage of Big Owner ܤ݅݃݋ݓ݊݁ݎ  510 0.0009 0.0012 0.7734 0.4396  
Presence of State Shareholder with Minimum Influence ܩ݋ݒ݋ݓ݊݁ݎ  510 0.4667 0.3497 1.3345 0.1826  
Percentage of Outside Members ܱݑݐ݀݅ݎ  510 -0.1674 0.1442 -0,1161 0.2463  
Existence of the Tax Paragraph in Financial Audit Report ܶܽݔ ܲܽݎܽ݃ݎܽ݌݄  510 0.4304 0.3271 1.3158 0.1888  
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Here, the P-value of independent variables “interest expense coverage ratio, earnings before tax (EBT) to revenue ratio, 
and earnings before tax (EBT) to total assets ratio” is lower than 0.05; thus, there is a significant relationship between 
independent and dependent variables. Also, since the coefficients of the variables are positive, the higher the ratios 
“interest expense coverage, EBT to revenue, and EBT to total assets” are, the greater the tax wedge will be. Also, 
according to the results, there is no significant relationship between differences in declared and final taxes and other 
variables including firm size, debt ratio, the ownership percentage of the big owner, presence of the state shareholder 
with minimum influence, independence of the board (the percentage of the outside members), and existence of the tax 
paragraph in financial audit report. 
 
4.3 Further findings  
 
As observed in Table 1, the difference in declared and final taxes is homogenized based on the revenue of the 
companies, but the descriptive statistics provide other practical information which has been presented in table 9. 
 
Table 9: Descriptive statistics of dependent variable  
 
Variables Symbol Min Max Mean Median Stand. Dev 
Percentage of Difference in Declared and Final Taxes to the Final Tax οܶܣܺ 0.00 100 34.3 20 35.4 
 
According to table 9, since the minimum, maximum, mean, and median values of “percentage of difference in declared 
and final taxes to the final tax” are respectively equal to 0, 100%, 34.3%, 20% of the final tax, it can be concluded that the 
tax wedge of half of the companies are equal to 20-100% of the final tax. Identifying these companies in the early stages 
of tax proceedings based on firm characteristics and corporate governance leads to the faster and lower-cost collection of 
taxes. 
 
 Conclusion  5.
 
Taxes not only constitute an important part of government revenues, but also they are used at the same time as one of 
the most important tools of fiscal policies to achieve economic and social goals. Taxes collected from legal entities, 
especially the manufacturing companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange constitute an important part of this 
revenue; on the other hand, a major part of the energy and facilities of the Taxation Affairs Administration is spent to deal 
with tax issues of these companies. Hence, investigating the tax issues of manufacturing companies listed on the Tehran 
Stock Exchange is of utmost importance. Accordingly, in this study, it was attempted to investigate the relationship of firm 
characteristics and some corporate governance features with differences in declared and final taxes with of companies 
listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. In this regard, the data of 102 manufacturing companies in the period of 2004-2008 
(510 observations) were selected to develop the research hypotheses; then, the hypotheses were analyzed using the 
generalized panel method of integrated data. The reason for selecting the period of 2004-2008 is that the taxes of 
companies are finalized after one or more years. The results obtained from fitting the model indicate that there is a 
positive and significant relationship between “interest expense coverage ratio, earnings before tax (EBT) to revenue ratio, 
and earnings before tax (EBT) to total assets ratio” and differences in declared and final taxes. As a result, the higher the 
ratios “interest expense coverage, EBT to revenue, and EBT to total assets” are, the greater the tax wedge will be. Also, 
according to the results, there is no significant relationship between differences in declared and final taxes and other 
variables including firm size, debt ratio, the ownership percentage of the big owner, presence of the state shareholder 
with minimum influence, independence of the board (the percentage of the outside members), and existence of the tax 
paragraph in financial audit report. Considering the research findings, the following suggestions are provided: 
1- Due to the positive and significant relationship between “interest expense coverage ratio, earnings before tax 
(EBT) to revenue ratio, and earnings before tax (EBT) to total assets ratio” and differences in declared and 
final taxes: 
A) It is recommended to auditors, experts and officials to calculate the mentioned ratios in the early stages of 
tax proceedings and implement comprehensive plans for companies whose ratios are higher than the 
industry average. 
B) It is recommended to managers and accountants of companies with higher “interest expense coverage 
ratio”, “earnings before tax (EBT) to revenue ratio”, and “earnings before tax (EBT) to total assets ratio” to 
calculate and declare their tax costs more accurately, because it seems that their declared taxes are lower 
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than other companies’. 
2- Since the percentage of difference in declared and final taxes to the final tax is considerable (average of 34%) 
and on the other hand, tax proceedings and issuance of tax assessment are done with a large time interval, 
which leads to a delay in the collection of taxes, it is recommended to the Taxation Affairs Administration to 
implement incentive policies for companies with low tax wedge. 
3- Considering the methods used in previous studies, such as “the amount of tax wedge”, “the ratio of tax wedge 
to the declared tax”, “the ratio of the declared difference to the final tax” as well as the method used in this 
research (the ratio of tax wedge to revenue), it is recommended to determine “the ratio of tax wedge to 
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